Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen!
It is my distinct honor, as Acting Head of State representing His Majesty the King of Cambodia, to bestow the rank of Général hors Classe, with Five-Stars General, upon Samdech Tea Banh and Samdech Men Sam An. Allow me to provide some clarification. I am not delivering the pre-prepared remarks. I’d like to offer several key considerations for our historical analysis. Several days ago, (1) I delivered approximately 20-30 kilograms of documents pertaining to complex historical events to General Nem Sovath for the review by Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh. This included all my published works.
It is imperative to highlight that each recipient of today’s award has served no less than 55 years in the military. Samdech Men Sam An and I entered military service concurrently in 1970, marking 55 years of service to date. Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh’s enlistment predates ours; historical accounts indicate he was previously wounded in an incident where he was mistakenly believed to have been killed. His original name was Tea Sangvan, a detail altered following the incident. My professional relationship with Samdech Men Sam An spans 48 years, commencing in late 1977 upon my arrival back in the country to locate my wife.
During a period of illness requiring hospitalization, she and an elderly brother, already deceased, visited me. (2) This marked the commencement of the next phase of assembling the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea’s armed forces, the foundation of today’s military. My role extends beyond that of a soldier; I am also the architect of this fighting force.
Regarding Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh, our meeting took place in January 1979 at the former Czechoslovakian Embassy, now the European Union headquarters. During my 35 years as Prime Minister, Tea Banh served as Minister of National Defense. His prior roles included Deputy Chief of the General Staff, followed by his appointment as Minister of Public Works, Transport, and Post, at a time when these ministerial portfolios were not yet separately defined. However, at the commencement of negotiations, our Ministers of National Defense and Foreign Affairs withheld their supports.
At the time in question, His Excellency Koy Buntha served as the Minister of National Defense. There was this internal assessment. The input on that issue from the Ministry of National Defense was that were there any (political) negotiations, it would effectively be obliterating the previously established national social achievements.
Regarding foreign affairs, upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, I concurrently served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for a brief period. I subsequently delegated the ministerial portfolio to HE Kong Korm. He, too, opposed the negotiations, and there was a parliamentary intervention he delivered offering no support to the process.
Consequently, I was forced to carry out a ministerial reorganization. Minister Koy Buntha was transferred (from defense to) the portfolio of Minister of Social Affairs, and Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh was appointed Minister of National Defense. Furthermore, HE Kong Korm was transferred to Minister of State Inspection. I then personally oversaw the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(3) A soldier does not need to have 100% of a soldier blood. S/he needs 50% of her/his blood as soldier but 50% as politician. We cannot just talk about fighting and nothing else. My initial assignment to Samdech Pichey, following his visit to my residence near the Independence Monument, involved devising a strategy to neutralize the Thai armed forces and government. (4) This was the initial task of his tenure as Minister of National Defense. It was not to attack them, but to find every way to neutralize the Thai armed forces and administration, to preclude their military support, which previously involved both infantry and artillery units, of the Khmer Rouge. Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh did a successful job leading to a reduction in Thai military and administrative involvement with the tripartite forces, particularly the Khmer Rouge, culminating in my January 1989 visit to Bangkok.
In that situation, I sensed a compelling reason for him to become the Minister of National Defense. His tenure as the Minister of National Defense spanned 35 years, coinciding with my 38-year tenure as Prime Minister. It was reassuring to have Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh’s presence, as if having an army nearby. This is my gut feeling. Tea Banh was always there to help whenever a challenging situation occurred. This recounts a past event. Specifically, Samdech Men Sam An was gradually involved in the movement, developing the army and party strength collaboratively. In essence, it was a joint endeavor.
Regarding (5) the implementation of the win-win political strategies, I’m not sure whether it would have been realized without the contributions of Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh. At that time, based on intelligence reports, the situation was precarious. However, Samdech Pichey was adept at analyzing such circumstances. Intelligence reports indicate that Ee Chhean and Ta Mok held a meeting in a specific hotel room. According to this report, Ee Chhean could have been a dead soul. If that was the case, who would lead Pailin? And, should Pailin, considering the report’s suggestion, rise up and join with Tamok, how significant the threat could be? Then, there would not be Ee Chhean at this Peace Palace, would there? Ee Chhean had the protection of Samdech Pichey Sena. I have faith in Samdech Pichey.
That intelligence information could have ended Ee Chhean’s life. The Sok Pheap’s case was of moderate severity, while Ee Chhean’s was serious. Had we accepted the intelligence reports regarding Ee Chhean’s alleged conspiracy with Ta Mok at that time, it would not need the Khmer Rouge’s resistance as a whole (to change the situation). Only the Pailin forces refused to integrate and turned to cooperate with the Khmer Rouge, it would have been sufficient to finish off our effort to implement the win-win policy. The challenge lies in the analysis and assessment of the situation. We understood that Ee Chhean and Sok Pheap, particularly Ee Chhean, was the one who fought with and chased after Tamok. How else, could it be that Ee Chhean was negotiating with Tamok. Nevertheless, we subsequently collaborated effectively.
Upon receipt of the royal decree, I promptly disseminated its contents. I extend my gratitude to His Majesty for the distinguished honor bestowed upon Samdech Pichey and Samdech Men Sam An, elevating them to the rank of Five-Star Général hors Classe. We received a Facebook comment indicating that Samdech Sar Kheng was unaccounted for. I responded by clarifying that Samdech Sar Kheng is a civilian and thus holds no military rank. Indeed, from 1997 to 1998, Samdech Kralahom stated that he would only wear a rank of no higher than a colonel. We experienced ranking inflation at that time.
Let me emphasize that (6) never try to inflict internal division of the Cambodian People’s Pary (CPP). Any actions taken to divide this organization will ultimately result in own self-division. Therefore, I urge you to refrain from any attempts to fracture CPP. History demonstrates that such actions invariably lead to internal discord. I am prepared to take action. Numerous factions have attempted to fracture the CPP, yet the outcome has consistently been self-division. I will persevere in this endeavor, ensuring accountability […]
May I address an issue before the assembled army officers here. I always say that (7) some commanders are good at attacking but not good at defending, and vice versa. In the past, I required commanders skilled in both offensive and defensive strategies. Both offense and defense are equally important, so one must be equally adept at both. Please understand that Hun Sen’s statement reflects his extensive expertise in both offensive and defensive strategies […] let alone the (8) establishment of a strategy or methodology that we used for some time called “destroying enemy living force through defensive positioning”. The enemy cannot comprehend this tactic.
Following the setback at Pailin, we initiated a strategic regrouping of our forces. All units, commencing with Divisions 179, 6, and 4, were withdrawn and consolidated, with the exception of Divisions 196 and 95, which received reinforcements in Kamping Puoy and Phnom Thipadei […] The enemy, observing this, continued their advance and assaults, and they suffered casualties of approximately 20 or 50 in each successive engagement. When their strength was weak, we started to attack at once.
His Majesty the King Father and Her Majesty the Queen Mother remain witnesses to that event. On June 2, 1991, in Jakarta, His Majesty the King Father said that the Khmer Rouge lied to him. At the Paris Conference, the Khmer Rouge asserted that the withdrawal of the Vietnamese army would lead to the swift collapse of the Hun Sen government. He continued “not only did it fail to crush His Excellency Hun Sen, but Hun Sen nearly succeeded in conquering all the territory.” We employed this destroying (enemy) living forces through defensive positioning strategy from the late 1989 into early 1990.
Following that, we engaged in more fighting. When I was negotiating with His Majesty to establish the SNC (Supreme National Council) in Bangkok, Samdech Pichey accompanied me. Back then, we did not have smartphones. We had to use our 751 transceiver, which we mounted it in the Plaza Hotel. (My assistant) Ho Sithi was the operator. During my visit to the the battlefield, (9) I commanded that Kae Kimyan had to take Svay Chek by 3pm. The military advantage was necessary to strengthen our negotiating position that evening. However, around 2:30pm, Ho Sithi informed me that Svay Chek had already been secured. I respectfully informed His Majesty that, “upon entering Serey Pheap village, please exercise caution. I am unable to guarantee your safety as my forces are advancing on Thmar Puok to liberate it”. At that time, we unfortunately lost Svay Chek and Thmar Puok, but retaining Phnom Srok. We subsequently retook Svay Chek and pushed toward Thmar Puok, near to Serey Pheap village. These are some of my recollections.
Before discussing the history of Cambodian (military) ranks, I would like to express my gratitude to the government for graciously allowing the use of the Peace Palace for the conferment ceremony. I am looking forward to having my own place soon. I constructed this place, but I am not currently residing there, and the current occupants are not certain to stay here for 100 years. Currently, I am building another one at the Senate Palace, which is smaller than the Peace Palace, but I aspire to have my own palace someday. I propose to His Excellency Prak Sokhon that he continues as chairman of the construction committee, even in his government role. Next year, if we undertake a similar program, I will not need to ask for the use of this location.
Today’s scheduling is quite a coincidence. The original plan was for the morning of March 24th, but it would result in some programs overlap. Today, the Prime Minister is attending the inauguration ceremony at Takhmao’s Hun Sen Sereipheap High School. He is accompanied by several Deputy Prime Ministers and ministers. We’re having another event here. The television broadcasts are overlapping, resulting in a division of broadcasting teams. I am preparing myself to accept a pain that will happen in the near future. I will be away for a short time, so everything needs to be prepared beforehand. This concerns the lives of my family members. People will be aware of it soon enough. The human experience is characterized by birth, aging, illness, and death.
Allow me to talk about the history of military ranks in Cambodia. We divide it into stages. The initial phase spans from Cambodia’s independence to 1970. During that time, while viewing the documentary, we would see that His Majesty the King Father wore only the rank of a two-star general during his royal crusade for independence and his coronation on Independence Day. Subsequently, we observed other generals adorned with three stars. I’m unsure how many stars His Majesty the King wore then. We observed that Samdech Chakrei Nhek Chulong, Lon Nol, and others were wearing three stars […] By 1970, Cambodia’s highest-ranking military officer was Field Marshal Lon Nol.
In the Pol Pot regime, there were no military insignias, which were later only established in Cambodia between 1987 and 1988. The regulations were quite stringent at that time. Sub-regional ranks such as Long Sopheap were only allowed to wear the insignia of lieutenant colonel. Heads of military regions are permitted to wear the insignia of colonel. Hul Savon was the only military officer to have been bestowed the highest rank, a single star general, upon his transfer from military region 4 to 5 to replace Prom Din.
Aside from that, Prom Din and Long Sopheap were bestowed the military insignias of colonel. (10) We had a challenging time preparing (the military insignia). However, following the implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement, a competition for higher ranks ensued. Those from the border regions, the tripartite coalition, encompassing the army of the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPLNF), held prominent positions. Therefore, it was necessary for those of us inside to increase in ranks.
Regarding the history of my rank insignia, it may serve as a reminder of when Hun Sen held that rank. I served as a soldier from April 4, 1970, until June 18, 1993, when I attained my military insignia. How was the rank bestowed? This is related to historical factors which I would like to share some with you. (11) Following the election, numerous challenges emerged. Within the CPP, there were differing views regarding the election results. In that case, several provinces, including Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, and Kampong Cham, experienced secessionist movements. I decided to take a chance.
On the morning of June 14, 1993, we commenced a parliamentary session. Mr. Yasushi Akashi (the UNTAC Chief) offered me a helicopter transport to Kampong Cham, Prey Veng, or Svay Rieng, but I declined. I instructed Gen. Kun Kim to travel by water. I chose water travel since my brother, who held the position in Kampong Cham province, was misled into a secession attempt involving the 2nd Military Region, then under Nhek Huon’s command.
Numerous tanks were repositioned for deployment near O Raing Ov, and these tanks were concealed in Ba Phnom prior to a coup attempt on July 2, 1991. (12) The situation was complex, but through coordination, we successfully managed it. My mission was to escort Prince Chakrapong and His Excellency Sin Song to see His Majesty. I undertook a perilous journey. I promptly proceeded to Kampong Cham. Upon my arrival in Kampong Cham, the UNTAC radio broadcast announced that Prince Chakrapong had departed Prey Veng for Vietnam. I traveled from Kampong Cham to Prey Veng to see Sin Song. I met Sin Song. Let me share what had happened.
Sin Song, a valued colleague and co-founder of the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea (NUFSK), has already passed away. Along with my group, there was a contingent from Sin Song who sought refuge in Vietnam with Sar Not. We adopted the National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea – NUFSK, at that time.
Sin Song had a gun on his waist, and I was unarmed. I retired to Sin Song’s room for the night. Later, Sin Song entered the room, pulled out a revolver, and then put it away. I waited for Prince Chakrapong. It was until approximately 7:30 p.m. that His Highness arrived in Prey Veng from Vietnam. On June 17, 1993, I facilitated a visit for His Excellency Sin Song and Prince Chakrapong to pay their respects to His Majesty.
I believe Samdech Kralahom may recall the meeting prior to my Royal Palace visit. (13) On June 13th, the day prior to the parliamentary session, I convened a meeting at party headquarters. During this meeting, I addressed the 51 CPP parliamentarians and other party leaders, emphasizing the necessity of securing a two-thirds majority. Failure to secure a two-thirds majority would be catastrophic, as the combined forces of Funcinpec and Son San pose an existential threat. However, let us not overlook the constitutional requirement of a two-thirds supermajority for approval. Without the CPP, it would be impossible (to do anything).
Should there be no agreement, I am content to allow the State of Cambodian to continue. I have given my recommendations. Upon arriving in Kampong Cham, I was quite fatigued, having attended a parliamentary meeting earlier in the day and then traveling to Kampong Cham in the evening. An urgent communication was received from Phnom Penh requesting my immediate return by brother Chea Sim and brother Heng Samrin for a scheduled meeting in Phnom Penh. I inquired, “have all the people in Phnom Penh perished?” I was involved in a perilous mission, why I was summoned to the joint UNTAC and SNC meeting at the Royal Palace. I was unable to attend.
However, I recall that brother Chea Sim and brother Heng Samrin went to the meeting and decided on the 50 plus 1 principle. That is what Samdech Kralahom raised a question to me as to how were we goung to do regarding the 50 plus 1 principle. On that day, I visited His Majesty at a building behind the location where it was used previously to receive credential during the former State of Cambodia. At that time, I respectfully informed His Majesty that (14) I disagree with the 50-plus-1 principle for forming a future interim government. Two-thirds majority reflects the CPP’s commitment to avert destructive attempts. This summarizes the events of that day. The strategist and the person responsible for conveying ideas are here present. If you are unaware of this account upon my passing, then you will remain uninformed.
This story could be televised, but our national television network may not be skillful with utilizing these documents. Regardless of the television director appointed, the situation remains unchanged, and there will be no progress. I hope the Minister of Information will kindly gather all the previously available, useful documents. At that time, His Majesty graciously allowed a limited opening, stating, “It remains Your Excellency’s responsibility to negotiate with the other parties.”
That was sufficient though. We had reached a consensus after discussions with the other parties, using the two-thirds formula. Our understanding at that time was that without their agreement to the two-thirds principle, I would not approve the adoption of the Constitution. The Cambodian Constitution’s enactment hinges on the CPP’s participation in its approval process. Otherwise, the existing Constitution of the State o Cambodian and the administration in its areas (under control) must remain in effect.
Today, we will share a strategic detail. Before my public appearance, I met with brother Chea Sim sometime between June 17th and 18th, 1993. Brother Chea Sim was not yet the Samdech. We assembled in Chamkar Mon headquarters. I went to Chamkar Mon, as it offered a more defensible position. I visited Brother Say Phu Thong and invited him to Brother Chea Sim’s residence. Following that, I departed from Brother Chea Sim’s residence and proceeded to Samdech Paan Road, where the Samdech Krom Preah resided. At that time, the State of Cambodia delegation comprised myself, Sok An, and a few other colleagues. We had a small closed meeting. However, I recall that His Excellency You Hockry and another individual, whose name escapes me at the moment, were present on behalf of Funcinpec.
(15) I suggested to Samdech Krom Preh that to foster mutual trust and facilitate the drafting of the Constitution, we should establish an interim government in accordance with the Paris Peace Agreement. My government will be dissolved upon the Constituent Assembly’s transition into the National Assembly. Following the formation of a new government, my administration will be dissolved. Therefore, I propose the dissolution of my government and the establishment of an interim government with co-prime ministers. That was my proposal.
Upon our agreement to establish an interim government, Samdech Krom Preah readily concurred. If our disagreement persisted, I emphasized, despite your party’s holding 58 seats to my 51, your influence in my region will be significantly limited. It seems unlikely that we would reach an agreement to set up the Constitution. He consented. Subsequently, we engaged in a discussion regarding the Ministries of National Defense and Interior. During that period, Ranariddh and Hun Sen had concurrently served as co-ministers of defense and co-ministers of Interior. As this much has been said, please let me give the rest. The Paris Peace Agreement mandated UNTAC oversight of the Interior, Information, Finance, Defense, and Justice ministries. After signing the Paris Peace Agreement, we established a Ministry of Security, which was entrusted to Sin Song, while the Ministry of Interior was entrusted to Samdech Kralahom. At that time, I invited Samdech Kralahom to a meeting so that he could attend to his ministerial duties.
(16) A number of ministries have been reorganized. UNTAC were mandated to oversee the Ministry of the Interior. It was not mandated to oversee the Ministry of Security. That’s how the ministry of security was established. That’s was the story. That’s the underlying deception. Several purported Paris Peace Agreement experts are unfamiliar with it. They seem to misunderstand, and they’ve gone too far. We were instrumental in the creation of the Paris Peace Agreement. Several points were being revised, despite the tripartite support’s claim of no reserves, while the State of Cambodia did have reserves, as on which and where should adjustments be made. Even the nationwide proportional representation electoral system planned by the five big countries also met with my objection. I have some reservations. Initially, during our discussions in Pattaya, on their side they proposed the nationwide proportional representation electoral system and our side proposed the plurality system. I invited brother Chem Snguon (then Minister of Justice) to my home to discuss the issue. Should we accept the nationwide proportional representation system as proposed by UNTAC, my concern was that it might allow the Khmer Rouge into parliament due to potential ballot mixing. Therefore, we agreed that the provincial proportional representation system might be a more suitable approach. We brought the system for adoption in New York.
(17) I would recommend our children and grandchildren to maintain the proportional representation system by province. We are also reviewing this matter. Could we explore establishing a system of accountability from senators to voters, similar to the model used by the National Assembly? Currently, we lack clarity on regional assignments due to the size of each region consists of four to five provinces. Therefore, should we consider restructuring Senate constituencies, perhaps aiming for a model with approximately 25 constituencies and a defined number of candidates per constituency. It would be beneficial to investigate that issue.
During my chairmanship at the Senate, I discovered a lack of clarity regarding the senators’ awareness of individual assignments and responsibilities. Therefore, we should also investigate this matter and improve the system to ensure that each Senate member is responsible to their constituents. Otherwise, they will sit still and just earn their salaries, their assistance with community and council projects, such as road and dam construction or water pumping, appears unlikely. I believe it’s necessary.
Now we return to the consensus-building phase, shall we? Samdech Krom Preah and I reached an agreement after negotiating between 3pm and 5pm. I subsequently returned home to report to brother Chea Sim, as our residences were quite close. We were in accord. Strangely, we received notification from the Royal Palace around 10pm that Samdech Chea Sim had reservations regarding the agreement between Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh. At that time, there were no Samdech Krom Khun, Samdech Krom Luang, or Samdech Krom Preah; only princes. The information had come from the Royal Palace. The message, relayed by Mr. Huot Vanthan, came from former French Ambassador Philippe Coste, who reported a discussion taking place at the Royal Palace.
I didn’t know what to do. There was only one way. I requested that brother Huot Vanthan convey a message to the French Ambassador, inquiring whether His Majesty would permit brother Chea Sim and myself to proceed together. This was the only recourse, as there were individuals disseminating misinformation regarding our incompatibility. Brother Chea Sim was said to have literally voiced his opposition. That’s when brother Chea Sim was described as being the hardliner, while Hun Sen, on the other hand, was seen as more pliable. What a stark difference it had become.
The stages were distinct. Previously, (18), brother Chea Sim, Sar Kheng, and others were categorized as the hardline group, while Hun Sen’s group was considered the more moderate faction. Subsequently, they framed the Srk Kheng group moderate and the Hun Sen group hardliners. That’s what was said according to a given the situation. Perhaps they’re not quite synchronic with the music. As for us, we tune our dancing movements correctly with the rhythmic […]
At that time, we received royal permission (to have an audience with HM the King). Her Majesty the Queen Mother’s birthday was on June 18, 1993, and a celebratory party was held at a banquet hall to mark the occasion. Brother Chea Sim and I arrived, but we were not aware of the party’s dress code. Upon our arrival, His Majesty the King Father seated brother Chea Sim to his right. Her Majesty the Queen Mother and His Excellency Akashi were also seated at the table. My seating arrangement required me and Samdech Krom Preah to sit facing each other.
His Majesty inquired regarding the report “I heard that His Excellency Chea Sim objects to the agreement reached between His Highness Ranariddh and His Excellency Hun Sen”. Brother Chea Sim denied the allegation saying “I support it, Your Majesty”. His Majesty has received Prince Ranariddh’s report already, but desired a further briefing from me on the agreements reached. I informed His Majesty that the initial agreement stipulated the dissolution of my government and its replacement by a provisional government, with Prince Ranariddh and myself serving as co-prime ministers.
Furthermore, there would be Co-Ministers of Defense and Interior. Regarding the military, the appointments would be made with His Excellency Kae Kimyan as Chief of Staff, His Excellency Nhek Bun Chhay as Deputy Chief of Staff, and several other deputy chiefs of staff. The first was Kae Kimyan, and the second was Nhek Bun Chhay. Before my departure, Pol Saroeun, then Chief of Staff, advised me to focus on the necessary tasks rather than personal concerns. Therefore, I appointed Kae Kimyan as Chief of Staff. Subsequently, Prince Rannaridh and I would serve as Co-Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces. The Co-Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces differs from the Co-Commander-in-Chief of the army because the former’s authority extends to all armed forces.
Upon informing His Majesty of the situation, I respectfully mentioned my current position as Minister of Defense, while lacking a formal military rank insignia. I understand that Prince Ranariddh holds a certain rank insignia. (I was joking at that time). Let me go back a bit. While the State of Cambodia was reducing its ranks, the tripartite forces that was residing in Thailand maintained their full complement. In that case, Prince Ranariddh holds the esteemed rank of General Hors Classe, a position exceeding typical military ranks.
(19) His Majesty inquired of me, “Your Excellency Hun Sen, if I were to bestow upon you the rank of General Hors Classe, would you accept it?” I expressed my gratitude. He then addressed brother Chea Sim, asking, “Your Excellency Chea Sim, if I were to bestow upon you the rank of General Hors Classe, would you accept it?” Brother Chea Sim accepted and expressed his thanks.
On June 19, 1993, a royal decree was issued, appointing General Chea Sim, General Heng Samrin, and myself as General Hors Classe. It was originally published in French. Even my title of “Samdech” was not originally in Khmer. There was no royal decree in Khmer. We convened to discuss the excessive ranking within the former Council of Ministers prior to 1994. A compromise was reached. One rank was lowered from the five stars to four stars, and another from four stars to three stars, and in subsequent order. We applied that principle, resulting in a change from my five-star to a four-star.
When was I awarded this 5-star rank again? […] His Majesty surprised me on two occasions. The first occasion was when I was given the title of Samdech. However, His Majesty subsequently had Samdech Chaafa Vorviengchey inviting the Supreme Patriarch to discuss who deserved to have what title, leading to the appointments of Samdech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo, Samdech Dhamma Pothisal, and Samdech Ponhea Chakrei. At that time, the Supreme Patriarch employed the term “Maha,” while His Majesty appended “Akka Moha,” and so forth. We lacked prior knowledge. A royal decree was then unexpectedly issued. Subsequently, three individuals were each awarded five gold stars.
This information was not unavailable to us. This was a royal gift, not a request; Who would request a rank to be appointment. (20) Also in 2007, His Majesty reinstated the General to the five-star rank. However, this five-star rank was not conferred upon Samdech Krom Preah, who remained a four-star General due to his previous demotion. During that period, military personnel began searching for the designate numbers of Samdech Krom Preah – which was 00001, and myself, which is 00002 […] These two numbers should be left to the two people – Samdech Krom Preah and I. I am unsure of the assigned numbers for bong Chea Sim and bong Heng Samrin; however, my designation is 00002, and Samdech Krom Preah is 00001. Numerous zeros are present since our army numbers in the tens of thousands.
To date, two individuals have been awarded the 5-gold star general – myself, and Samdech Heng Samrin. We will be joined today by two distinguished five-gold star generals – Samdech Pichey Sena Tea Banh and Samdech Men Sam An. I am exceedingly pleased that both dignitaries have been recognized by the King with this prestigious title, a fitting tribute to their exemplary service to the nation. Regarding the monarchy, both Samdech have significantly contributed to its restoration, from initiating negotiations and drafting the Constitution to safeguarding the King’s position to the present day.
The national motto, “Nation, Religion, and King,” has been fully addressed. (21) I extend my sincere gratitude to the two distinguished Samdech for their invaluable support and companionship during our extended engagement with dignitaries from the Cambodian People’s Party and the Royal Government.
Globally, how many political entities possess the CPP’s capacity and longevity? A coalition of five groups has governed Cambodia for 48 years. May I reiterate, refrain from attempting to undermine the Cambodian People’s Party. The more you do, the more endanger you put yourself in. If you were to attack us, we will return the attack to you. It is imperative to allow for a natural progression. You are incapable (to change that). On the contrary, you will break yourself, without us having to break you. A robust Cambodian People’s Party and government will ensure the defeat of our adversaries. Thank you to all attendees.
I extend my wishes for peace and prosperity to both Samdech and the party members in the coming New Year, acknowledging that it may be a period of personal mourning for me. I trust you will all experience peace and prosperity, in accordance with the Buddha’s five blessings./.
