His Excellency Professor Tetsuya Watanabe, President of the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA),
Excellencies, Ladies, and Gentlemen, Distinguished Guests!

[Start of elaboration 1]

Before we begin, I would like to briefly explain that getting wrong information or wrong history can lead to wrong judgments for the future. Referring to the fact that Jakarta was the first location for the peace process negotiations, after the negotiation between me and Prince Norodom Sihanouk commenced, and where many events about Cambodia’s peace process had been organized, I would like to take this opportunity to highlight some issues that are not known and that some researchers and writers, Cambodians as well as foreigners, still confuse and misrepresent, to the point of considering the Paris Agreement as the Constitution and/or more valuable document than the Cambodian Constitution.

I hope you all can join me in spending some time (to study this topic). This is part of the sharing of experiences (of building peace in Cambodia), and after this I will publish it as a booklet. My commentary today will also be broadcast live to Phnom Penh for Cambodian television and sharing with the Cambodian people. I hope you all will be patient to listen to this exposure. The one who is sitting is not the one that is tired. I hope the one who is sitting and listening is not more tired than the one who is standing and speaking.

[End of elaboration 1]

Today, I am truly delighted to present to you a lecture on “Perspectives and Experience of Peacebuilding Efforts in Cambodia.” I would like to express my appreciation to the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)​ and relevant institutions for organizing this workshop to share Cambodia’s peacebuilding experience. Although each country may have different experiences, contexts, and political and historical situations, and it may be challenging to apply Cambodia’s experience to those of other nations, I am convinced that the fundamental ideas of the “Win-Win Policy” are truly valuable in establishing the foundation for long-lasting and inclusive peacebuilding.

For those not so familiar with Cambodia, I would like to emphasize that under my initiative and leadership, the “Win-Win Policy” had brought full peace and territorial unity to Cambodia in 1998 without bloodshed among Cambodians. This marked the first time in the last 500 years, since the fall of the Angkor Empire, that Cambodia achieved complete and lasting peace. The experience of national reconciliation without the use of bullets or bloodshed is perhaps unique to Cambodia in the world. This is not a boast of oneself but this peace was really hard-won, considering Cambodia’s painful history of innumerable sufferings, and tragedy of auto-genocide.

Every moment and every step were a matter of life and death, and I have dedicated my entire life and journey to ensuring survival and peace of my unfortunate nation. When I fled to Vietnam in 1977, I had an option to seek political asylum and live comfortably, but I asked Vietnam to support the forces I had mobilized to overthrow the genocidal regime. Vietnam could have doubted my reports and chosen not to support my proposed military campaign. Looking back, we certainly understand that without the liberation on 7 January 1979 by the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation supported by the Vietnamese volunteer troops, Cambodia as a nation might have faced complete annihilation. Some accuse Vietnam of invading Cambodia, but to put it bluntly, I would counter-argue that if Vietnam had wanted to annex Cambodian territory, it could have allowed the Democratic Kampuchea regime to continue its rule until all the Cambodian people were wiped out. Vietnam did not need to launch a military campaign and sacrifice its volunteer troops. Here, we must have justice to Vietnam, because without Vietnam, no other country would have stepped forward to topple the bloody Pol Pot regime. For over 40 years, not only do accusations against Vietnam persist, but there are also extremist tendencies to deny the existence of the genocide under Democratic Kampuchea, and for a country that barely survived and rose with difficulty from such genocidal regime, we must defend such historical facts and prevent the recurrence of such a brutal and heinous crime. That is why, recently, Cambodia has enacted the “Law against Non-Recognition of Crimes Committed during the Democratic Kampuchea Period”.

[Start of elaboration 2]

At this point, let me clarify a little about some of the accusations. Initially, (for what happened) from 1975 to 1979, If we don’t turn to Vietnam, who should we turn to? Who will help liberate Cambodia? If Vietnam really wanted to take over Cambodia, Vietnam didn’t need to launch a military campaign to liberate the people. It would be enough to hit the goal by just letting the Khmer Rouge kill and starve the people to death. Vietnam didn’t need to spend any bullets, because at that time, Cambodia was killing its own people. This is one thing.

Another thing is that Vietnam came to Cambodia and withdrew. If they wanted Cambodian territory, why did they need to withdraw their troops? It would be easier to leave the troops in the country. This is a point we must protect the historical truth, because that is how it happened. If there was no Pol Pot genocidal regime in Cambodia, what would we need to ask the Vietnamese army to help us for? I will comment on the behavior of Vietnam at the time I relied on them to build the national salvation armed forces.

This is a historical fact, and it all connected. In the world, Vietnam helping Cambodia (to escape from genocide) is not the only case. The allied forces together put out the fire of World War II. The issue of ending the genocide regime (is the same). Now it is even clearer because the hybrid court between Cambodia and the United Nations has already convicted the Khmer Rouge regime. They cannot play the math of “1 minus 1 is equal to 0”. On one side, they condemn the Pol Pot regime. On the other side, they condemn those who oppose Pol Pot. Should they play this game in a real political context? This is a questionable point regarding the historical factors of Cambodia.

[End of elaboration 2]

The beginning of Cambodia’s tragedy started with the coup that overthrew His Majesty the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk in 1970. At that time, tens of thousands of patriotic youths, including myself, decided to join the resistance forces in the jungle at the call of His Majesty the late King Father. However, the dream of liberating the country from foreign domination under the Lon Nol regime on 17 April 1975 was replaced by a tragedy of bloodshed under the leadership of the extremist ideology of the Khmer Rouge, which sought to turn Cambodia into a communist Utopia, by completely eradicating all social classes, slaughtering the rich and the educated, and destroying all social and economic infrastructures. In just three years, eight months and twenty days, the Khmer Rouge killed more than three million innocent Cambodians.

Unable to bear the atrocities of the Pol Pot regime and unwilling to remain silent and watch the Khmer nation collapse, I, then serving as a Regiment Commander controlling and commanding over 2,000 soldiers, decided to flee to Vietnam and risk my life as a last resort to liberate the country from the Pol Pot genocidal regime. On the night of 20 June 1977, four comrades and I left a military post in Koh Thmor village, Tonlong commune, Memot district, Tbong Khmum province in the eastern part of the country to cross the border into Vietnam. At that time, I had a few options to resist the Khmer Rouge, but I chose to flee to Vietnam to ask Vietnam for help to liberate Cambodia, which was the best and historic decision that ensured the survival of the Khmer nation. At that critical moment, I determined that the steps I took were not merely to seek personal survival but to save the entire country.

[Start of elaboration 3]

At this point, I would like emphasize the four options that I had at that time […] Option 1 was to use my 2,000-strong army to occupy some areas. This was a dangerous option as the 2,000 troops to fight Pol Pot’s 180,000-strong army. It was impossible. But in the first instance, we could occupy some localities and areas. But then we would fall into the bloodbath of Pol Pot’s repression.

Option 2 – withdraw to Vietnam to seek help in liberating the country. This option is not new to Cambodia. After Lon Nol’s coup, King Norodom Sihanouk also relied on foreign friends for help, including Vietnam, which came to help from 1970 to 1975. It’s not a bad option.

The third option is to do nothing and let the Khmer Rouge capture and kill me. The fourth option is to commit suicide. This is the last option. But this suicide option is not a good one. However, I am already prepared to commit suicide if I were to be captured on my way to Vietnam and sent back to Cambodia […] I have 12 needles in my trouser pocket. If Vietnam sends me back to Pol Pot, then I will stick all 12 needles in my throat and commit suicide. I will not let the Khmer Rouge kill me.

Can you imagine that at the age of 25, I had to leave my pregnant wife? The current Prime Minister was only five months in her womb at the time. My life of struggle was miserable. After the death of my first child due to a doctor’s careless handling, my wife became pregnant with another child, who is the current Prime Minister of Cambodia. However, millions of tear drops were not just from the pain of losing my wife and children, but from the pain of losing the Cambodian people and the entire nation, who suffered and died every day. The choice I made was not to save just myself. I apologize. Whenever I talk about this, I cannot hold back my tears.

Even though I have changed my status from a person who ventured for the survival of Cambodia nearly 50 years ago, my bitterness still haunts me. Because of this, I have changed my mind and will not let anyone destroy the peace in Cambodia. The Cambodian people are too fed up with suffering. In more than 500 years of history, never has the Cambodian people been as peaceful as they are today. Cambodia has always had many controlled areas. I will not allow anyone to destroy this hard-won peace. I apologize. I should not be crying here, but I can’t help it.

I would like to reiterate that when I went to Vietnam, I was advised to leave for a third country. Please note that seek help from Vietnam is not just as easy. Vietnam respected the principle of sovereignty (of Cambodia). It was not that Vietnam came to welcome us. Vietnam argued that “Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea have diplomatic relations, so Vietnam cannot interfere in Cambodia’s internal affairs. So, please, everyone can go to a third country.”

At that time, Vietnam mentioned some countries such as Australia, Japan, France, Canada and was will to let us leave. I told the Vietnamese side, “If you can’t help us, please give us our weapons back and I would go and die with my people.” At that time, I was only 25 years old. Compared to now, 25 years old is a student who has not yet left school. But I became the leader of the national liberation movement. When such a danger arose, I determined that the path to take was not to find a way to survive for myself, but to save the nation.

[End of elaboration 3]

Without an indomitable will and a clear plan for the nation, the Vietnamese friends would not have trusted me and helped me build an armed force of over 10,000 Cambodian troops and formed a political organization which was the Kampuchean United Front for National Salvation, and​ they would not have ultimately allowed the Vietnamese volunteer troops to help Cambodia either.

Following the liberation on 7 January 1979, we shouldered the enormous burden of rebuilding the country from scratch. On the one hand, we had to protect against the potential return of the Khmer Rouge regime and ensure the safety of our people. On the other hand, we had to strive to find and provide food for our starving people, establish national governing institutions, and rebuild the economy at a time when our human resources had been almost decimated. Not only was the domestic situation the most difficult, even the international situation was also unfavorable to us, in which we had to endure unjust economic, political, and diplomatic embargoes and sanctions. The international community did not recognize the government which liberated the nation, and Cambodia’s seat at the United Nations was occupied by the Khmer Rouge for 12 years.

[Start of elaboration 4]

As a 27-year-old foreign minister, I was insulted. I still remember it to this day. After serving in the army, I became foreign minister at the age of 27. Then I became deputy prime minister and foreign minister at the age of 29. Later, I became prime minister at the age of 32. So, I can be considered the youngest prime minister in the world, but also the longest-serving prime minister in the world because I served as prime minister for 38 years. You might think that the current prime minister of Cambodia is young, but when he became prime minister, he was 45 years old. When I became prime minister, I was only 32 years old. So, I can say that I am among the young generation who contributed to returning Cambodia to the state it is in today.

[End of elaboration 4]

The process of seeking peace and political and economic reform in Cambodia after its liberation from the Khmer Rouge was the most perilous period for me, because firstly, our internal situation was not in complete agreement, and proposing policies such as seeking negotiations with other Khmer factions or introducing market economy in the economic management process, such as land ownership, were highly sensitive. Secondly, we had to acknowledge that we were governing the country with the presence of Vietnamese troops in it. Thirdly, the former Soviet Union was Cambodia’s aid provider. However, I would like to emphasize that both Vietnam and the Soviet Union respected Cambodia’s independence and sovereignty in deciding its national destiny.

[Start of elaboration 5]

At this point, I was not walking on a paved road. I was walking on a road with countless obstacles. A road full of dangers when I officially became Prime Minister on January 14, 1985, at the age of 32. I started to carry out political and economic reforms in three unfavorable situations, all of which could be lethal to me. What were those weapons of death?

Firstly, there was not a unified understanding of those reforms internally. When it came to political reforms, I wanted to say that we must find a political solution instead of using war or it means there would only be negotiations and no war to end the war. People may ask how many people had agreed with this?

At one point, I dropped the foreign minister post to someone else. The then foreign minister and the defense minister disagreed (with the political reforms). I was forced to change the two ministers – the defense minister and the foreign minister. I had to take back the foreign minister position (while holding the Prime Minister post). If the Prime Minister need to negotiate, but the foreign minister and the defense minister disagree, how could we negotiate? So, the only option left is to remove the dissenters to give me a chance to achieve the political reform goal.

About the market economy, especially regarding the granting of ownership to the people, is not a small matter. Pol Pot has already taken away all the ownership of the people. We must give the ownership back to them, starting with land reform. (It is known that) land reform is a difficult and not a small matter, especially since Pol Pot had taken away all the ownership and evacuated people from one province to another throughout the country. The issue (raised on) the reform here is whether we should recognize ownership before 1975 or recognize the current ownership. This was an issue that took time (to study thoroughly). The reform from a planned economy to a market economy was not a small matter. We must explain it internally. If internally there is opposition, I may lose support and my political life might be over.

Second, when political and economic reforms were carried out, nearly 100,000 Vietnamese army was present in Cambodia. Vietnam had not yet undergone economic reforms, while Cambodia had to implement a market economy and open negotiations with Cambodia’s opponents. So. if Vietnam did not respect Cambodia’s independence and sovereignty, did not support Cambodia’s decisions on its political, economic and social issues, I would have faced difficulties. But Vietnam has respected what Cambodia has decided.

Thirdly, at that time, Cambodia received aid only from the Soviet Union and the CMEA countries, which were Eastern European countries. At that time, the Soviet Union did not yet have Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost. So, if the Soviet Union told Phnom Penh – “if you let Hun Sen remain as Prime Minister, the Soviets will stop providing aid,” that would be enough to kill me (politically). Even if I didn’t lose my life, my political career would be over.

I should thank the leaders of Vietnam, the leaders of the former Soviet Union, who respected Cambodia’s decision. I would like to thank the leaders of the Cambodian People’s Party at that time, the President of the State, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and other leaders who supported my decision to reform both politically and economically, shooting both arrows at once. If we did not do that, would Cambodia have peace today? This is something we need to see. The results, however, clearly show that we have peace.

This morning, when I took the lift, I said to my colleagues that everyone should know that when we were negotiating (for the Cambodian political settlement), we only received US$50 each. Those who traveled with me to negotiate, traveled around the world or no matter how many countries, including the First Deputy Speaker of the Senate (currently), we only received US$50 each. I would not allow any wasteful spending. I myself received US$50 too. Now, we give US$500 (or something like that) to the students and/or diplomats working here […]

We have several stories to share. When I started as Foreign Minister, I had only 16 kilograms of food, including 10 kilograms of rice and 6 kilograms of corn. This is the true story. We built the country from scratch. We ate whatever we could find with the people. We did not run away from the people. This is the point where I highlighted the dangers that could happen to me. On the contrary, I was lucky to be able to overcome obstacles, from internal misunderstanding (about political and economic reforms), the presence of Vietnamese troops in the country at the time when Vietnam had not yet reformed, and when the Soviet Union, which was the donor, had not yet reformed.

However, I also have an art (of being omnipresent). When I went out to negotiate, Hun Sen was known all over the world. I used international factors to promote internal reforms and used internal reforms to promote international negotiations. This is a complementary philosophical relationship between the inside and the outside.

[End of elaboration 5]

When becoming the Prime Minister of Cambodia in 1985, I was only 32 years old and was the youngest Prime Minister in the world at that time. Shortly after assuming the position of Prime Minister, I declared that no military means would resolve Cambodia’s conflicts; only negotiations and political settlements amongst Khmers could bring peace to Cambodia. It is in this spirit that I issued a five-point declaration in October 1987, to solve the Cambodian problem, namely:

(1) Organize a Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting;

(2) Complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, along with the cessation of all aid and support to the forces of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea;

(3) Organize an election with international observers to form a coalition government that adheres to the principles of neutrality and non-alignment;

(4) Negotiate with Thailand to establish a safe and peaceful border and arrange for the voluntary repatriation of refugees; and

(5) Organize an international conference to ensure that the agreement would be reached, with the participation of both governments (Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea and the People’s Republic of Kampuchea), the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, Vietnam, India, and other countries.

[Start of elaboration 6]

These are the points that I had proposed. Why did we mention India? Let me mention a little history so that everyone can understand (the story) in the past. After the independence period in 1953, led by His Majesty the King Father of the Nation, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk, the Indochina War was still ongoing. So, there was the Geneva Conference in 1954. In Cambodia, there was an International Control Commission (ICC) […] At that time, there were three actors – India representing the neutral countries, Poland representing the socialist countries, and Canada representing the free countries. That was the history. That is why India is mentioned here. But we use the word “and other countries” to mean “whom” do the other parties care about.”

[End of elaboration 6]

At this point, I would like to elaborate on a historical truth that I was the first person to express the desire to meet His Majesty the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk using the above principles as a basis for continuous negotiations to find peace. With this in mind, I was the sole driving force behind the first meeting which we called the “Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting” on 2 December 1987 in Fère-en-Tardenois, France, which paved the way for the true negotiation process towards a final political settlement through the signing of the Agreements on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict or Paris Agreements on 23 October 1991, which was achieved through the will and true patriotic spirit of His Majesty the late King Father Norodom Sihanouk and myself, Hun Sen.

Before reaching the conclusion of the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements, we had worked hard on those core tasks, which were fundamental, essential and indispensable. Of course, many countries had provided assistance and full support to Cambodia in the negotiation process, which lasted almost four years. For instance, France and Indonesia played an important role as co-chairs of the Paris Conference on Cambodia, when many of our discussions were held there. Meanwhile, Australia pushed its initiative to place Cambodia temporarily under UN supervision during the transitional period. France and Japan, while contributing to the peace agreements, had broadly supported Cambodia’s reconstruction and development efforts. Similarly, Thailand had largely aided these efforts and supported the repatriation of over 370,000 Cambodian refugees. Vietnam, with the complete withdrawal of its troops in 1989, also helped break the deadlock in the negotiations regarding the future of the Khmer Rouge and the presence of foreign troops.

Let me clarify this a little so that we can understand the Cambodian problem more clearly. The Cambodian problem has two aspects: one is the internal aspect and the other is the international aspect. It can be understood that the internal aspect is an armed conflict between Khmer and Khmer, which has up to four groups. Although there are two governments, one of which is a tripartite coalition government, occupying seats at the United Nations, these tripartite governments each have up to three armed forces. The other is my government in Phnom Penh. This is an armed conflict of the internal aspect.

[Start of elaboration 7]

Let me clarify this a little so that you can understand the Cambodian problem more clearly. The Cambodian problem has two aspects – one is the internal aspect and the other is the international aspect. It can be understood that the internal aspect is an armed conflict among the Cambodians, which had up to four armed groups. Although there were two governments, one of which was a tripartite coalition government, occupying seats at the United Nations, and this tripartite coalition group each had its own armed forces. The fourth is my government in Phnom Penh. This was the armed conflict of the internal aspect.

The international aspect includes the Vietnamese army in Cambodia, the tripartite army on Thai soil, and the provision of foreign arms to the tripartite coalition government. This was a situation that need to be resolved. But the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in 1989 raised the price (for the Phnom Penh side). I will talk about it in a moment. I told you all before coming here about the development of the Supreme National Council or SNC. I am revealing a secret today to you all and to all historians. Some people only know about the Paris Peace Agreement, but what led to the realization of the Paris Peace Agreement, they have forgotten or even violated.

[End of elaboration 7]

I take this opportunity to recall that the basis of the negotiation process supported by the friendly nations in the international community, and, more importantly, the initiative and effort of Cambodian people to establish the Supreme National Council (SNC) for Cambodia. As evidence, during the second “Sihanouk-Hun Sen Meeting” in Saint Germain-en-Laye in 1988, I initiated the creation of a high-level national unification council, which had one chairman and two vice-chairmen, discussed in the first round of talks, called JIM-I.

[Start of elaboration 8]

And (the Jakarta Informal Meeting-1) JIM1, which I joked about, was in fact held in Bogor. I joked with my Indonesian friends that it would be correct to call it BIM because it was the Bogor informal meeting. However, we called it JIM1, then JIM2, but some people wrote to JIM3. There was no JIM3, only JIM1, JIM2, and IMC. I wanted to clarify this point because I was a player in every stage. I negotiated with many partners. I alone gathered all the elements. Others may have many partners, but no more partners than I do (inaudible).

The negotiations to establish the Supreme National Council were not successful at that time, but then the agreement, with the support of General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, led me to sign it with Prince Norodom Sihanouk in March 1990 in Bangkok […] If we talk about the content and the goals, it is the same, just the name was changed from the Supreme National Unification Council to the Supreme National Council. The signing (of the Supreme National Council) was only between Prince Norodom Sihanouk and myself. The tripartite (coalition government members), including the Khmer Rouge and Son Sann’s parties, had not yet agreed. So. Japan intervened with the participation of HE Chavalit Yongchaiyudh.

I would like to give more information on this point. In the past, the Japanese government did not talk to me. So, in order to solve this problem, as the Prime Minister, along with the Minister of Defense, I traveled across the sea at 2:00 am from Koh Kong Province (of Cambodia) to Thailand and continued to Pattaya to meet H.E. Mr. Yukio Imagawa, who later became the Japanese Ambassador to Cambodia, to facilitate a meeting. That facilitation led to a meeting in Tokyo under former Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama.

The most memorable thing at that time, which the Khmer people should be proud of (for having returned from) division to national unity, was that even at a banquet, two tables were set up, one for the tripartite coalition side and the other for the Phnom Penh government. The Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama was at the tripartite coalition table eating three dishes from the menu of six. Vice Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada, the current emperor’s father-in-law, was at the table with us. After the three dishes were finished, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama switched to the table with us and Vice Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada to the tripartite coalition table. (There were things that could not be reconciled) to that extent. At that time, we did not agree. But we must strive, no matter how little the result was, and even if we only hoped for 1%, we must strive. (We) use negotiations rather than fighting on the battlefield (which led to) the loss of human lives.

At the beginning of the negotiations, Prime Minister (of Japan) Toshiki Kaifu participated. Then Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu withdrew. The Khmer Rouge also boycotted. However, we still managed to sign because by that time, HE Chavalit Yongchaiyudh had become Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense of Thailand and had gone to mediate with Japan. Both HE Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada came to see me at the Hotel New Otani (Tokyo). (The Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Hisashi Owada) said, “It is not logical to sign this because the Khmer Rouge faction of the tripartite coalition government has boycotted. But I ask HE Hun Sen to accept this illogical thing.”

I said, “Okay! Okay, for the success of all Cambodians. We accept this kind of signing.” So, the first signing was in Bangkok, the second in Tokyo to establish the SNC according to the formula of 6+6 or 6+2+2+2. This is how thing went. In Tokyo, they only tried to create a framework, but who the members were, where the members were from, they hadn’t been prepared yet. They had to come and organized in Jakarta. Jakarta is the place of preparation, and I would like to reveal all this here so that it can be published as a book later. For what? If I die, there will be no people (who had been in the process) to talk about it. I don’t die easily, however. I can still play golf.

When the meeting was organized here in Jakarta, His Majesty King Norodom Sihanouk did not come. So, the Phnom Penh government side put in six people, while the Khmer Rouge side put in Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, the Khmer People’s Liberation Front put in Son San and Ieng Moly, and the FUNCINPEC side put in Prince Norodom Sihanouk and Prince Norodom Ranariddh. At that time, we did not have a meeting, but HE Ali Alatas was the organizer.

When I saw the composition, I told HE Ali Alatas, “Your Excellency! In order to ensure that this agreement is respected, I would like to request that the name of HM King Norodom Sihanouk be removed. If we all issue a statement in Jakarta and suddenly King Norodom Sihanouk sad that “I will not be a member of the Supreme National Council, would HE be held responsible?” At that time, Funcinpec proposed that the prince (Norodom Ranariddh), who was not yet the Samdech Krom Preah, and Chao Sen Kosal, known as Chhum, who later became the person to convene the meeting.

For this reason, the statement at that time included the composition that I specified – the Cambodian state side had six people and the tripartite coalition side had Khmer Rouge with Khieu Samphan and Son Sen, the Khmer People’s Liberation Front with Son San and Ieng Moly, and FUNCINPEC with Norodom Ranariddh and Chao Sen Kosal. However, we kept a phrase that said, “If necessary, the SNC can elect a 13th person as the president of the SNC.” Please refer to (the text of the statement) again. Some people only talk about the history of the negotiations, but they don’t know where it comes from. I gave them the opportunity to know how the SNC was born in Jakarta and why there was no name of Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk (from the beginning).

Then it was a stroke of luck. While I am here in Jakarta, I also let out the secret agreement between me and Prince Norodom Sihanouk on June 2, 1991 in Jakarta. This was an arrangement that I think was probably coordinated by Indonesia and Thailand, so that the delegation of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and my delegation, plus the Khmer Rouge delegation, traveling from Bangkok to Jakarta, would travel together on the same plane. At that time, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk invited me and my wife, but my wife did not come with me, to have dinner (with him). I was also surprised because during a party, Indonesia suddenly said, “Tomorrow there will be a good working dinner.” They knew in advance, so they already had cooperation. Cooperation from (arranging) to fly together, to have a separate meeting between me and Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk.

When I met Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk and Samdech Mae, who is now the Queen Mother of the Khmer Nation […] Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk said to me, “The Khmer Rouge deceived me.” The Khmer Rouge promised me, “As long as the Vietnamese army withdraws, your government will be blown away like a piece of paper. But now the Khmer Rouge could not do anything to you. You have almost taken back all the land.” At that time, he said that he would return to the country, abandoning the Khmer Rouge (and) other parties. He proposed, “Let HE Heng Samrin be the head of state, HE Chea Sim be the president of the National Assembly, and HE Hun Sen be the prime minister.” But Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk wished to establish a national presidium, with Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk as the president, and me, Hun Sen, as the vice president, and one more member, Nhek Chulong, and would keep the national flag and the Constitution. At that time, we had changed the name from the People’s Republic of Kampuchea to the State of Cambodia.

On day four, I went to see His Majesty again (to ask) whether he would like to live in the Royal Palace or (the former state residence of) Chamkar Mon? His Majesty said, “Your Excellency! I do not want to be king, but if I could live in the Khemrin Palace, that would be good. I would be grateful.” At that time, we began to communicate (by) phone from Jakarta, ordering Samdech Kong Sam Ol to prepare for the urgent renovation of the palace. We promised each other to “keep this a secret.”

However, when I arrived in Bangkok, while I was resting, I suddenly heard that Thai Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, who had become Prime Minister after the coup that overthrew Chatichai Chunhawan, had asked to meet me at the hotel. As usual, I always met Thai leaders at the Government House. This time, the Thai Prime Minister came to see me, bringing with him the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, the Commander-in-Chief of the army, and the Director of the Prime Minister’s Office. That’s when the news started to leak out. Anand Panyarachun asked me, “Is it true that Prince Norodom Sihanouk is returning to the country?” I said it was true. He said, “Yes, but where would the Khmer Rouge and Son San be?” This issue had led to a rapid intervention by the tripartite faction, as well as tripartite supporters, who proposed an immediate change of SNC membership from Chao Sen Kosal, nicknamed Chhum, to Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk.

The SNC was founded in Jakarta and had its first meeting in Bangkok, led by Chao Sen Kosal, also known as Chhum. There was no consensus. So, when the SNC was founded, we immediately started meeting in Pattaya, Thailand. At the time of the meeting in Pattaya, there was no chairman. Let me explain this clearly. The meeting in Pattaya was led by Samdech Preach Norodom Sihanouk, but the chairman had not yet been elected. When was the SNC chairman elected? Where? The second SNC meeting was to be held in Beijing. At that time, the chairman was elected by mutual agreement between me and Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk. I asked to see Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk separately.

At that time, it was said outside that a visit by HE Hun Sen to North Korea was prepared for him as his guests, and that my wife and I would become His Majesty’s and Samdech Mae’s godchildren. When we went inside, His Majesty asked me, “What is the problem, Your Excellency?” I then said, “Your Majesty! Now the SNC does not have a chairman. The previous formula, with you as chairman and me as vice chairman, did not work. My side did not agree”. This is an increase in price. In the past, I proposed one chairman and two vice chairmen, and I planned to add three vice chairmen to have both the State of Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge, and the Son San factions. But, as all the Vietnamese troops were withdrawn, and we were still strong, we were asking for a chairman and two vice chairmen. The price has gone up.

I told him – “the idea of ​​you being the president and me being the vice president is impossible. But I have some formulas. The first formula is that you and I are co-presidents. The second formula is to have a rotating presidency. There are also two formulas for rotating presidency – a rotating presidency where you are the president once and I am the president once, or a rotating presidency where 12 people rotate. But there is one formula that I would like to propose, which is the formula where you resign from the tripartite coalition government, from the presidency of FUNCINPEC, and remain on top (of everyone else). So. you can be the president alone. This is a very logical proposal, and it is also respectful because you represent the country, SNC represents the country.

His Majesty immediately replied, “When I go (back), I must remain neutral and stay above all else.” So, His Majesty said, “Your Excellency is a good drafter. Please draft the declaration.” I drafted the declaration and had HE Cham Vithya present it to His Majesty at his residence in Beijing. In fact, it was only presented for His Majesty to see as an agreement, but he signed it before the deadline. So, the SNC chairman came about like this. It was an agreement between Sihanouk and Hun Sen, with him leaving the tripartite coalition government and sitting on top of them. The SNC chairman started from that place. Therefore, please remember that this is how it was in the history. There is nothing different from that. There are some living witnesses, not all of them. This is just a confirmation so that we can all understand this matter.

That is where I want to reveal the secret. Let me clarify another point. Some people continue to criticize King Norodom Sihanouk, asking why he used North Korean bodyguards to protect him. I would like to inform you that this is not King Norodom Sihanouk’s fault. It is my fault. I am responsible. Do not criticize our father of the nation. This happened in Jakarta, when there was an agreement about his return and the establishment of the National Presidium. He will reside in the royal palace. On June 2, we met again. On June 4, we met again. I asked him, “Where are you going to stay?” His Majesty said, “Your Excellency, protect me. Beware of the fact that the Khmer Rouge could enter the palace and kill me.”

I said it was okay. My forces will protect (your safety). But in case you want to choose foreign bodyguards like from France, please take them to protect you. My force protects you from the outside, and they protect you inside. Then he said “I will take from North Korea.” So, when I visited North Korea, I met with President Kim Il-sung, and at the dinner together, I asked President Kim Il-sung to send a team consisting of bodyguards, food inspectors, and medical personnel to help me protect Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk’s safety. So please don’t blame HM for not trusting Cambodian forces.

Things had even reached further stage. This is history. We have to talk about it all. We started to negotiate in Pattaya again. But before arriving in Pattaya, there was a meal between His Majesty and Luang Mae, with me and my wife. At that time, His Majesty said, “We will not take guards (from either side). The Thai side will send a battalion to protect the Royal Palace in Phnom Penh.” Suchinda Krapayoon, who was the commander of the Royal Thai Army at that time, requested that a battalion of Thai troops be sent to protect the Royal Palace. Therefore, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk said that he would not take bodyguards either from North Korea or Thailand, but would use the forces of HE Hun Sen.

“Your Majesty”, I said “if we use Thai troops to protect the Royal Palace, it will be a great loss to your politics as well as mine. That means the East withdrew, the West moved in. This is a great political danger. But for North Korea, I have already proposed to President Kim Il Sung. So, we must continue to use what has been agreed upon. As for the Thai troops, let me talk to Suchenda Krapayoon.” So, when I got to Pattaya, I said to Suchenda Krapayoon that we should not do that. It would damage Cambodia’s image that while in the east Vietnam withdrew, in the West, Thailand entered the Royal Palace. It is not good. So. the Thai side agreed, but later the Thai side still put a team in the Royal Palace […]

Let’s talk about it, break it down, in detail, because it is no longer a secret. There are still secrets that have not been revealed. I spoke in a 48-hour video, but it was to be released only in another 10 years. It was published as a book, and there are videos. I still have more secrets because it’s not just about the peace talks, there’s also land reform, internal issues within the Cambodian People’s Party itself, and there’s more to this and that. Well, I can’t talk and release it yet. But my children and some of my trusted people have already received the videos.

[End of elaboration 8]

Returning to the Paris Peace Agreements, it was clearly a significant and positive turning point in the history of Cambodia. As a result of implementing these agreements, Cambodia was able to restore its relations with the international community, and the Royal Government of Cambodia formed through elections organized by UNTAC also regained its seat at the United Nations. These agreements help Cambodia adopt a new constitution in 1993 that embraced the constitutional monarchy, multi-party liberal democracy and free market economy. Cambodia acknowledges and has a deep sense of gratitude to the international community for its efforts to bring peace to Cambodia within the frameworks of the United Nations and Cambodia’s friendly countries.

Nevertheless, with many positive outcomes achieved, UNTAC left Cambodia without fulfilling its mission completely. Despite the Paris Agreements, the Khmer Rouge did not comply, and the United Nations also failed to force the Khmer Rouge to disarm and participate in the democratic process. In other words, the ultimate goal of achieving complete peace, as outlined in the Agreements, was not realized. Even after the elections and the establishment of the Royal Government in 1993, civil war continued to prevail in a situation where Cambodia had separate controlled areas between the Royal Government and the Khmer Rouge.

[Start of elaboration 9]

At this point, I would like to emphasize that what the Paris Peace Agreement wanted but UNTAC could not achieve was that UNTAC’s withdrawal did not end the war in Cambodia. The international community must clearly see the role of HM the King of Cambodia, Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk. Many countries that have signed up to the UN operation had not yet withdrawn their forces, such as Angola, and others. But in Cambodia, they must be grateful to Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk and never forget him, or otherwise, UNTAC would be stuck in Cambodia. Just not recognizing the election results would be enough to make UNTAC stuck. But all political parties, except the Khmer Rouge, respect Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk.

You have to know the historical factors (of Cambodia). The key role that decided UNTAC to be able to move out was Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk. There were a number of actors, but the only one who could mediate was Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk. No one else. I remember clearly that on the day the Constituent Assembly became the National Assembly and the process of forming a government, the President of UNTAC, the Vice President of UNTAC, the Commander of UNTAC all withdrew at night for fear of being caught (in a stalemate if there was a situation). I would like to emphasize that without Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk, UNTAC would have been stuck in Cambodia. However, I would like to emphasize again what the Paris Peace Agreement wanted but UNTAC could not achieve, namely finding peace for Cambodia. It has achieved some, but the war continued, between one side, the area controlled by the Khmer Rouge, and the other side, the area controlled by the government that emerged from the elections.

Cambodia has always had multiple zones of control at the same time. Before 1970, in addition to the government forces, there were the Khmer Rouge, Khmer Rouge White, and Khmer Rouge Blue forces, all of which were armed. Between 1970 and 1975, Cambodia was divided into two zones of control, one controlled by Lon Nol, supported by the United States, to be honest, and the other by the Front forces led by Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk. From 1975 to 1979, we fell into the genocidal regime of Pol Pot, but Pol Pot did not have the ability to control all the territory. If Pol Pot controlled all the territory, where would my forces be?

From 1979 to 1993, Cambodia had four zones of control, one of which was my government, and the other three were the Khmer Rouge, KPNLF, and FUNCINPEC. From 1993 to 1998, Cambodia had two zones of control, one of which was the government that emerged from the elections organized by UNTAC, and the other was the Khmer Rouge. From 1998 to the present, Cambodia has had one territory, one armed forces, one parliament, and one king, for the first time in 500 years of history. It is not just a talk. Look at the written history. Not us writing it. UNTAC spent two billion US dollars. You may ask (UNTAC President) Akashi, (UNTAC Vice President) Berooze Sadri, and (UNTAC Force Commander) John Sanderson – who failed to enter Pailin.

On this note, I needed to find a formula called win-win politics. In 1996, we created a win-win politics that guaranteed three important factors. Firstly, it guaranteed life, as no one was arrested, no one was killed. Secondly, it guaranteed careers and jobs. Who does what? Thirdly, it guaranteed ownership of property, both mobile and immobile. These three guarantees made my DIFID strategy successful. What is DIFID? It is a strategy to dissolve the Khmer Rouge political and military organization. DIFID (comes from a strategy to) divide, isolate, finish, integrate and develop. These five letters are the goal of finding peace. But for peace, we must dissolve the Khmer Rouge political and military organization.

We have succeeded in this matter. There is no country in the world where the leaders of one side had visited the house of the Prime Minister (of the other side of the conflict). But in Cambodia, Khieu Samphan, who was the head of state and the Prime Minister and the cabinet of the Khmer Rouge, went to dine at my house. If he didn’t have the chance to curse me five times each time we meet, Khieu Samphan would not sleep soundly. Finally, Khieu Samphan went to my house. Some people criticized me, and they criticized Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, who just happened to meet with Khieu Samphan during his visit as Secretary-General of the Francophone countries.

I have invited Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea and the entire cabinet to my house to send out three messages through this. The first message is to the remaining armed forces to stop fighting because their leaders had surrendered to my house. The second is to send a message to the Cambodian people that the end of the war that you have all been waiting for has come. And the third message is to send a message to the international community that you are welcome to come, visit and invest in Cambodia because the war is over. This peace has been in place for over 26 years. Previously, the peace from 1954 to 1970 lasted 16 years, only to be disrupted by the Khmer Rouge, Khmer White, Khmer Blue, and bombing along the Cambodian-Vietnamese border.

The peace now, however, has lasted for 26 years and there are no armed forces (any more). (Cambodia) has many political parties, but there are not many different armed forces anymore. I say this not to brag, but it is a true story of Cambodia. In Cambodia, the convenience is that all the troops stay where they are and they were, just take off the Khmer Rouge unform, and put on the government uniform, fulfil the government’s duties, and abide by and implement the government’s laws. If s/he is holding the rank of division commander, s/he keeps the rank (but) we collect their weapons. We change from carrying out the duties of the Khmer Rouge to carrying out the duties of the government. Teachers continue to be teachers, but remove the Khmer Rouge books and put in the government’s books. Doctors are the same. In short, we have done it successfully. No other country in the world has done it the way Cambodia has. But it is not certain that the Cambodian experience can be replicated to other countries because the conditions of each country are different.

[End of elaboration 9]

It was at this point that I initiated the Win-Win Policy and negotiations between Khmer and Khmer in 1996 to unite and integrate all parties into a single government, single legal system, and single armed force, laying a solid foundation for lasting peace, national reconciliation, and national development.

This policy successfully ended more than three decades of civil war without a single bullet, but instead by the peaceful integration and dissolution of the Khmer Rouge political organization through the DIFID strategy (Divide, Isolate, Finish, Integrate, and Develop). I introduced the “Three Guarantees” which I firmly believe as the effective formula to make some members of the Khmer Rouge, who were fed up with bloodshed among Khmer people, to willingly reconcile and integrate into the society, where there were no winners or losers, but all Cambodians were winners having achieved the long-awaited peace. I had put my own life at stake for the second time in negotiating and promoting the implementation of the Win-Win Policy, until we achieved complete success on 29 December 1998, when the Khmer Rouge’s political and military organization was dissolved. The success of the Win-Win Policy has given Cambodia complete peace, unity of the armed forces, and complete control over its territory, which is a great social miracle we have ever experienced in the last 500 years of our history, as in the past, we were always a country with many controlled areas, no less than two at a time. (The importance of the Win-Win Policy is to force the former Khmer Rouge soldiers to lay down their arms, change their military uniform for a single national army, a single commander, a single legal system, and respect the motto “Nation, Religion, King” although they still retain their roles, ranks and careers they previously held, as well as the protection of their families’ lives.)

I have also thought carefully on the importance of pursuing justice for the Cambodian people, especially “justice for those who lost their lives and peace for the survivors” as a vital step towards national reconciliation in the aftermath of the conflict, by establishing the first international hybrid tribunal, known as Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC),  in collaboration with the United Nations, to bring to trial the five senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge for their atrocities and crimes against humanity, holding them accountable to both the world and national history. The extraordinary achievement of ECCC was concluded and jointly announced by the Kingdom of Cambodia and the United Nations in December 2022, which set a landmark example of this type of international tribunal, in not only bringing social reconciliation but also preventing retaliation or revenge and hatred among people in the country. (As of now, there are not many examples of transitional justice on the international stage. Even Rwanda, which went through a genocidal regime from 7^th April 1994 to 19^th July 1994, did not establish a hybrid court like that of as Cambodia did. Currently, we have more than 2 million pages of historical hard-copy and digital documents stored at the ECCC Resource Center ready for any research related to the combat against genocide and crimes against humanity by all people, and academic researchers as well as other international justice institutions to utilize the Khmer Rouge Tribunal of Cambodia case as a model).

[Start of elaboration 10]

I hope you are not tired. I still have more (to tell), but the tired one is not the one who sits and listens. The tired one is the one who stands and speaks. If there are any problems, you can go outside. For me, there is nowhere to go. If I am not here, it means that there is no one to give a lecture. I am just kidding. This morning, after eating, as I prepared myself and waited for the next schedule. I did some research. I asked someone coming from Phnom Penh where the fun places in Phnom Penh are now. Can you tell me? Suddenly, they said that there are places here and there. This is how to find out if you are into karaoke. These people have no experience. Just ask where fun is, and they will say that they know all the fun places. So, the one who knows the fun places is the one who has been there. I will not tell you who. Don’t let them get to your house, their wives will beat them. Their wives are also watching the live broadcast. This morning, there are two live broadcasts. One is the Prime Minister’s live broadcast, which is a construction site. The other is here, to Cambodia. So, some who have husbands coming here also watch the live broadcast to know what’s going on?

[End of elaboration 10]

The experience of post-war nation-building is a critical topic, as some countries, after a short period of peace, often relapse into conflict due to the delayed economic and infrastructure recovery, inadequate education systems, and limited access to the mental health treatment. For example, following the atrocities in Cambodia, over 70% of the population experienced mental health challenges, but we treated them through social protection, psychological education, religious education, and promotion of economic growth, particularly a shift from planned economy to a market economy at a time when the country was facing economic sanctions from all sides; however, we successfully resisted the reoccurrence of the genocidal regime and continued to pursue bold reforms.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Cambodia’s economy was weak, and its economic and infrastructure development was heavily reliant on foreign aid. We persistently exerted considerable effort to drive forward domestic reforms, while simultaneously striving for Cambodia’s integration into regional and global economy. Under my leadership, the Royal Government effectively launched and implemented the Triangular Strategy from 1998 to 2003, followed by the four phases of the Rectangular Strategy from 2003 to 2023.

[Start of elaboration 11]

I should emphasize this point to Your Excellency, Madam, and all of you who are partaking here. After the end of the war on December 29, 1998, which is celebrated as Cambodia’s Peace Day, I set out two goals and a triangular strategy. What are the two goals? The first goal is to transform all former battlefields into development zones, which we have now achieved about 95%. The remaining 5% is land that has not yet been cleared of mines and unexploded ordnance. So, areas that were once battle zones are now agricultural, industrial, commercial, or attractive tourist areas. The second goal is to transform borders with all neighboring countries into borders of peace, friendship, cooperation, and development. If we do not achieve these two goals, we will have difficulty. In order to develop, a nation must have two important factors. First, internal stability; second, good neighbors and good international relations. These are the two goals that were set out.

[End of elaboration 11]

The Triangular Strategy emphasized three key priorities, including: 1). Pacification with the aim to maintain order, stability, security, and peacebuilding within the country; 2) Cambodia’s integration into the regional and international community, including international financial institutions, and normalization of Cambodia’s relations with other countries to enhance exchanges of trade and investment; and 3) Socio-economic development, poverty reduction, governance, institutional and judicial reforms, and public sector management (To achieve success, our strategy and economic reforms are designed to be people-centered, byexpanding the middle class while reducing poverty.)

From its third to sixth mandates/terms, the Royal Government of Cambodia adopted and implemented the Rectangular Strategy to transform its role as the “Royal Government of Economy” with the motto: “Royal Government of Growth, Employment, Equity, and Efficiency”. This strategy involved executing a comprehensive economic agenda to improve and build the capacity of public institutions, strengthen good governance, and modernize national economic infrastructure such as roads, railways, and air connectivity to promote economic growth, create jobs for all citizens, ensure social equity, and enhance the efficiency of the public sector.

Alongside the promotion of internal development, we have also advanced regional and international integration to create new opportunities for diplomatic relations, economic cooperation, and sustainable development. I led Cambodia’s accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1999 and served as the ASEAN rotating chair three times in 2002, 2012, and 2022. Through ASEAN, Cambodia has gained tremendous benefits with various international partners, and we have established interconnected relationships through numerous bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements. Additionally, Cambodia succeeded in its effort to join the World Trade Organization in 2004.

[Start of elaboration 12]

In fact, Cambodia has been admitted to the WTO since 2003, but at that time we (could not ratify because the formation of parliament was blocked by) the two-thirds majority system. The Cambodian People’s Party’s victory in the election meant that it could not form a government (and needed to be resolved) for a year. We could not ratify (in 2003). At that time, my party had 73 out of 120 seats, with which we could not form a government because (we implemented) the two-thirds majority system. So, the delay in forming a government also delayed WTO accession by a year.

[End of elaboration 12]

By effectively formulating and implementing national development policies, Cambodia has changed its face dramatically when compared to countries that emerged from war at the same time as Cambodia. We have transformed from a poor and conflict-prone society to one that is stable, peaceful, and secure, and our people are beginning to reap the benefits of peace and development. The poverty rate was reduced to around 10% in 2019, but rose to 32.1% in 2021 due to the COVID-19 crisis. However, the introduction and implementation of highly effective intervention measures, both in managing the crisis and in stabilizing the people’s living standards, helped increase the people’s purchasing power and reduce the poverty rate to around 20.68% in 2023.

[Start of elaboration 13]

What it means is that (the poverty rate) is (around) 19%. This is the data we have. Previously (the poverty rate) had fallen below 10%. But COVID-19 has destroyed us, causing those who had crossed the poverty line to fall back. That is the problem caused by COVID-19 and not by anything else. But we have also worked hard to bring the poverty rate, which fell due to COVID-19, back up to below 20%.

[End of elaboration 13]

Cambodia has transformed from a country with a severe revenue deficit and dependent on development partners for two-thirds of its national budget to a country with the ability to manage its national budget responsibly, and with reserves to protect the national economy and the livelihoods of its people, and to withstand crises and disasters. We have transformed from a country isolated and sanctioned by the international community to a country deeply integrated in the region and the world, a country that can send peacekeepers and actively participate in peace agendas both in the region and beyond.

Cambodia’s role as a model peacekeeping force has been recognized internationally under the auspices of the United Nations and the female Peacekeeping Force. Currently, our deployed force numbers approximately 10,000 in 10 countries. This is a role that Cambodia can play in the search for peace, dialogue and confidence-building in peacekeeping negotiations and other roles with our strategic partners in responding to natural disasters, humanitarian crises and other man-made phenomena.

[Start of elaboration 14]

Previously, Cambodia was a recipient of the blue berets. We have been sending the blue berets abroad since 2006. We are ready to participate (in providing peacekeeping forces). Yesterday, I raised the idea that we could send (peacekeeping forces) wearing Indonesian uniforms but standing under the ASEAN image. If we can do that, it will increase the weight of ASEAN’s role. Cambodian troops are in some countries. If there is a consensus among ASEAN leaders, we can do it by just wearing the uniform or wearing the ASEAN insignia. It is a Cambodian peacekeeping force but sent to operate under the ASEAN umbrella, through the United Nations. It can also create what is called ASEAN’s role in the global order. We can do this.

[End of elaboration 14]

In fact, there are still several points that I wish to share; however, due to time constraints, I will now conclude the historical facts of Cambodia and proceed on to provide a summary of the fundamental lessons derived from our journey of peacebuilding and national reconciliation as follows:

1. Ownership of the nation’s destiny: A nation must have ownership of its national issues. When a nation loses ownership of its destiny, it will descend into divisions and disasters. Similarly, the quest for peace must originate from the citizens of the nation, and long-lasting solutions require participation from citizens and armed forces across all political spectrums before achieving national unity and a unified national armed force. Even though Cambodia received support from foreign friends and the United Nations, lasting peace could not have been attained if the Cambodian people had not strived to initiate and build it themselves. This is the true essence of the Win-Win Policy, which was initiated by Cambodians, participated and implemented by Cambodians, and reaped benefits by Cambodians.
2. The international community must work together to protect existing peace rather than search for or build lost peace. War is indeed a simple matter, but to end the war, Cambodia needed almost 30 years. We only have 26 years of complete peace, but it is also the longest peace in the last 500 years of Cambodia’s history. However, it is regrettable that we have faced unfair criticism that we talk only about peace and intimidate about war, and some of our young people have gradually forgotten the value of peace, and some even think of demanding a change of government by an undemocratic means, even if it means sacrificing peace. Such a trend is very dangerous that the entire international community must join in preventing, condemning and resisting such extremist ideologies. We must endeavor to educate people about the value of peace, because without peace, we cannot say sweetly the words “human rights, democracy and development”.

[Start of elaboration 15]

This point must be made clear. Some people talk a lot about democracy and human rights, but they have forgotten what is called peace. It is better to protect the peace that exists than to seek peace that has been lost. In the case of Ukraine, President (Donald) Trump said that it would be resolved in just 24 hours. I can say that even 24 months will not be enough. In my experience in seeking peace, just a ceasefire, what does it mean to have a cease fire? How to implement a cease fire? A cease fire in what place or with what conditions? Even the ceasefire in Gaza, how long can it last? Now the war has broken out again, more than ever.

In this regard, when there is peace, you have to protect the peace. If there is no peace, there is no meaning. We have to value it. Not me, but all of us. Now, if there is war, can we sit together here? This is true. So, for me, as long as we are here, we will not let anyone destroy the peace. No matter what the cost it may take. Let us be clear. I am not dead yet, and I have not left my political role. But does not mean that without me, there is no one to protect the peace. We have many people. Our people need peace.

[End of elaboration 15]

• Even if peace is achieved, peace will not last long without national unification, reconciliation, justice, and sustainable and inclusive development. Through the experience of Cambodia, we must endeavor to find ways to ensure that is peace lasting and firmly rooted in society through reconciliation and national unification. I would like to highlight the importance of fostering a “culture of dialogue” in Cambodia’s political culture, as our country has gone through a vicious cycle of violence, frequent regime changes by undemocratic means, and endless revenges. Even after Cambodia achieved complete peace in 1998, I continued to practice the “culture of dialogue” with various political parties to build harmony, strengthen national unity, and cultivate democracy. We recognize that democracy is a system of governance that respects diversity and provides an effective means of resolving and managing political disagreements using ballots rather than bullets and violence or insurrection.

Today, Cambodia has many political parties, but Cambodia no longer has many armed groups. It is also noteworthy that violence during elections has disappeared completely from Cambodia’s politics, thanks to the success of the Win-Win Policy. This is a historical fact of Cambodian politics, reflecting the political maturity and progress of democracy in Cambodia. (In this world, there is no standard definition of democracy; I generally understand that democracy must have peace as a precondition; when there is peace, we can enjoy freedoms, practice religions, pursue infrastructure development, and freedom of expression within the laws, as well as conduct regular elections. We respect the beliefs of the people, protect the private economy of the people while in tandem we enforce our laws to collect revenues for the state, maintain macroeconomic stability, and expand the potential of our human resources to become high-level human capital in order to build a strong national defense base. This is the path of democracy that Cambodia has been travelling and the one that we will continue to take moving forward).

[Start of elaboration 16]

First and foremost, we must realize that development requires peace. But to maintain peace, there must be development. If the poor are left to fend for themselves without attention, peace will be destroyed by the anger of the people. Therefore, we must consider peace and development as two ends of a knot. It is said that one side is peace and the other is development that we must maintain. This is the logic that links peace and development together. Without peace, there is no development, and without development, it is difficult to maintain peace. Therefore, we must promote this development.

[End of elaboration 16]

Efforts to reduce poverty and promote comprehensive and inclusive development remain an essential policy to maintain lasting peace and stability. When a country experiences widespread poverty and many people are unemployed and uneducated, people are susceptible to extremist ideologies that seek to scapegoat an institution or social group to express their anger. Therefore, this poses a significant burden for developing countries, as they lack the magic to manifest immediate development in all sectors across the countries, as some people desire. The government truly needs the support and understanding of the general population regarding the pace of national development, when a country does not have sufficient means and resources like developed countries. At this point, I also want advanced countries to understand the difficulties of developing countries as well. We want to see support from our friends; we do not want to see interference into our internal affairs, by exploiting our limitations of institutional capacity and resources and seeking to provoke anger among citizens and support extremist ideologies that aim to overthrow the government through undemocratic means. We ask for constructive support, rather than efforts to belittle, obstruct, or hinder our chosen path of development without consideration of values of peace, hardship, and the countless tragedies of the Cambodian people.

As I stated at the 76th UN General Assembly, history has repeatedly proven to us that interference, where the worst form of which is through military means to impose changes of political regime or other governance systems, is not a solution. On the contrary, such actions often result in greater loss of lives, human suffering, and the escalation of social and economic conflicts. Cambodia serves as a real-life example, having endured one of the worst and most unfortunate tragedies. In the recent past and in the present, we have still witnessed external interference from certain countries. Recent events, such as those in Afghanistan and Bangladesh, are great lessons to be learned on the significance of respect for the aspirations of each individual nation and the right of their people to self-determination, which underscore the value of allowing nations to shape their own paths. Large and small countries possess unique characteristics shaped by their history, culture, traditions, ways of life, and political systems. They should not be subjected to unilateral sanctions, prohibitions, economic measures, or other forms of coercion that violate international law and the principles outlined in the UN Charter.

I hope that today’s lecture will contribute to deepening the understanding of the values of peace and the difficulties in peacebuilding, national unification and reconciliation as well as preserving long-lasting peace, especially for developing countries. I hope that Cambodia’s experience in peacebuilding and nation-building will contribute to building a culture of dialogue and fostering a “win-win” element in resolving long-standing conflicts. Such an element is an indispensable basis for promoting peaceful conflict resolution and building a genuine, long-lasting and inclusive peace.

In conclusion, I would like to wish Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen, great blessing, happiness, prosperity and success in all your endeavors.

[Q&A – Elaboration 17]

Thank you for your good question. Firstly, I should talk about the intervention of the Vietnamese army. As I stated in my lecture, when I went to Vietnam to ask Vietnam to help build up our armed forces, Vietnam refused to help me, citing the principle of non-interference in internal affairs (of Cambodia as an example). However, the Khmer Rouge increased its attacks on Vietnam more and more. Vietnam could not have failed to receive specific information from Cambodia. Before I went to Vietnam, some Cambodians had fled to Vietnam, were captured by the Vietnamese and sent back to the Khmer Rouge. (They were) killed (by the Khmer Rouge). While being there, I could at least have helped prevent the people from being captured and sent back to Cambodia. However, Vietnam refused to provide assistance in organizing my armed forces. It was only later that Vietnam decided to help us build up our armed forces. Then we had two scenarios. Scenario 1 – we use the Cambodian forces themselves to fight. We occupy the east first and then move west, taking no less than three to five years. If (longer) than that, the Cambodian people would die. (It was because of that concern that) we had asked for intervention from the Vietnamese army. Vietnam intervened.

Vietnam did not want to be in Cambodia for a long time, but it was our request to protect (the country from) the return of the Pol Pot regime. That was why Vietnam delayed the withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia. In 1985, if I am not mistaken, there was a conference of foreign ministers of the three countries – Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos. I was the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. We announced that the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodian would be within five to 10 years. If it were to take five to 10 years, we would extend the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops to until 1995. It is a long time. The only way we had was to be self-reliant, which was to build up our armed forces, which increased the number of Cambodian troops and began to gradually withdraw Vietnamese troops since 1982. The Cambodian troops had been increasing in number. The number of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia had been decreasing. The strategic point was to replace the Vietnamese troops in areas where they helped defend with the Cambodian troops. We started from a mixed situation, which reduced the Vietnamese troops and increased the Cambodian troops.

I would also like to inform you here that the economic strength of Vietnam and Cambodia was not the same. I led a market economy, while Vietnam was continuing a planned economy but had also begun the first phase of reform. I had proposed that Vietnam withdraw all experts from Cambodia. I had a thought that we must improve the capacity of Cambodian officials. The new Party Secretary of Vietnam, Nguyen Van Linh, was also a reformer. On the way to negotiate with Samdech Preah Norodom Sihanouk in Saint-Germain-en-Laye, France, I passed through Hanoi. I proposed to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam to withdraw Vietnamese experts from Cambodia so that Cambodia could take charge of its own affairs. I still remember clearly that in June 1988, all Vietnamese experts were withdrawn, and the Vietnamese army was later withdrawn from Cambodia on September 30, 1989. It means that the Vietnamese army withdrew completely from Cambodia one year after the withdrawal of the Vietnamese experts. That has allowed our officials to learn to work on our own.

We must dare to tell the truth. When the Vietnamese army was withdrawn, we also suffered some losses. The Khmer Rouge launched an offensive. The tripartite coalition government forces launched an offensive, causing us to lose some territory. But in a short period of time, we regained control of the lost areas. The key here was to use our own forces to replace foreign forces.

Even now, I have always told foreign experts, both the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the IMF, and other countries – “everyone accuses me of acting under the orders of Vietnam. But when Vietnam was in Cambodia, I had the right to decide everything. Vietnam did not participate in making decisions. Now I am in trouble. If I do not follow everyone, they will cut off aid.” They even advised me to sell (the general department of) customs (and excise). But I did not follow their advises. They must know that the customs department is a sovereign service that can even be weaponized. How can we sell customs to private sector? We cannot follow them.

We have had an independent mindset from the beginning. We only need Vietnam to help prevent the return of the Pol Pot regime, but we must quickly build our own strength. This is our success./.